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DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR
DETERMINING EFFECTIVENESS OF
APPELLATE COUNSEL IN
CALIFORNIA
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel ...
[T]he. .. layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
of the proceedings against him. . . .
What duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid [of counsel] in the preparation and trial of the case. 2
The suggestion of Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama that
the "effective aid" of counsel is essential to a complete criminal de-
fense is widely recognized as the earliest judicial pronouncement on
competent counsel. Since that decision, many states have sought to
ensure the competency of counsel at every stage of criminal prosecu-
tion-including appeal.4
The leading California case on the right to the effective aid of
counsel at trial is People v. lbarra,5 decided by the supreme court in
1963. Although the standards laid down in Ibarra were not specific,
subsequent decisions0 have expanded these standards and have delin-
eated with greater precision the guidelines to be employed by the courts
in determining whether the criminal defendant has been denied his
constitutional right to effective aid of counsel at the trial stage of the
proceedings.
Recently, in the decisions of In re Smith,7 In re Greenfield,8 and
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
2. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
3. For examples of more recent pronouncements see Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d
641 (8th Cir. 1947); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1963).
4. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Steele, The Doctrine of the Right to Counsel: Its Impact
on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488
(1969); Note, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CRMGHTON L. REv. 103 (1969).
5. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
6. See text accompanying notes 7-49 infra.
7. 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
8. 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
In re Banks,' the California courts have attempted to establish quali-
tative standards for determining whether an indigent defendant has
received effective assistance of counsel on appeal as well. In these
cases, the courts have taken an unprecedented step in asserting super-
visory control over counsel.
This note will analyze these decisions in terms of the court im-
posed standards for effective counsel both at trial and on appeal and
will consider how these standards have been applied by the courts, and
may be applied in the future. It should be noted at the outset that
the courts, in judging effectiveness of counsel on appeal, have stated
that they will apply the judicially imposed standards for determining
effectiveness of counsel at the trial.1° Therefore, this note will begin
with an analysis of the standards for trial counsel developed by the
courts thus far.
Development of Standards for Determining
Effectiveness of Trial Counsel
In the leading California case, People v. Ibarra," the defend-
ant was charged with possession of narcotics. The defendant claimed
that he did not have the narcotics in his possession at the time of his
arrest; nevertheless, he was convicted. On appeal, the defendant
asserted that his constitutional right to the effective aid of counsel had
been denied because counsel had failed to object to the introduction
into evidence of the narcotics alleged to have been in defendant's pos-
session. The California Supreme Court found that the evidence had
been obtained through an illegal search and seizure, and that counsel's
express statement in the trial record' 2 that objection could not be made
to the search and seizure procedures clearly indicated that the defend-
ant had been denied effective counsel at the trial. The court con-
cluded that counsel was apparently -unaware of the rule allowing a de-
fendant to challenge the legality of a search and seizure even though
such defendant also denies possession of the seized article and asserts
9. 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1971).
10. See text accompanying notes 65-88 infra.
11. 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
12. "Following the testimony on the search and seizure, the trial court asked
defense counsel if he wished to object to the admission of the heroin. Defense counsel
replied, 'Well, your honor, in view of the testimony from the defendant that the
object in People's Exhibit WK-1 [the heroin] was not in his possession and was
not taken from him, under such circumstances I could not make a motion to object to
its introduction. So far as I know I would have no grounds since defendant has denied
this was in his possession or taken from him.' The court again inquired, 'I take it
therefore that there is no objection offered?'" Counsel replied in the negative and the
court admitted the heroin into evidence. Id. at 463-64, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr.
at 866.
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no proprietary interest in the premises involved in the seizure. 13 The
court explained that counsel's apparent lack of knowledge regarding
constitutional requirements for a valid search and seizure resulted in
the defendant's loss of a "crucial" defense. The court was apparently
influenced by the fact that the defendant had only one real defense at
trial-the illegal search and seizure of the heroin-and this defense
had been lost due to counsel's incompetence. The court held that since
this was a "crucial" defense, the defendant had been denied his right to
effective counsel.
The concept of ineffectiveness of counsel has been a troublesome
one for the courts, since the very term "effectiveness" has made the
formulation of black letter rules difficult. The court in Ibarra, how-
ever, enunciated the following requirements in an attempt to delineate
when the aid of counsel could be deemed ineffective. First, it must ap-
pear from the case as a whole that counsel's lack of diligence or
competence reduced the trial to a "farce or sham."' 4  Second, "an
extreme case" must be shown.' 5 Third, it must be shown that counsel
had failed in his duty to investigate all defenses of law and of fact that
may have been available to the defendant, and as a result a "crucial
defense" had been denied the defendant.' 6 Fourth, it must be shown
that counsel's failure to raise a crucial defense was not due to trial
strategy, but represented instead a "default of knowledge" which rea-
sonable inquiry would have produced.' 7  Finally, it must appear that
there had not been a mere mistake in judgment by counsel in his
failure to raise a crucial defense. Of course, these requirements-em-
ploying such terminology as "crucial defense," "faulty judgment," "rea-
sonable inquiry," "extreme case," and "farce or sham"--are obviously
no more subject to precise definition than is "effective assistance" of
counsel. Thus, though Ibarra may have solidified the basic elements
to be utilized in determining effectiveness of counsel at trial, the im-
preciseness of the court's terminology perpetuates the very evil which
they sought to eliminate-the nebulous nature of the determination in
any given factual situation.
Although the very nature of the subject makes hard-and-fast
factual delineations of standards for trial counsel impractical, certain
recurring factual situations appear in the cases which question the
effectiveness of counsel. For purposes of discussion, cases falling within
13. See, e.g., People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956); People v.
Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955); People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791,
295 P.2d 942 (1956); People v. Colonna, 140 Cal. App. 2d 705, 295 P.2d 490 (1956).
14. 60 Cal. 2d at 464, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465, 386 P.2d at 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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four general categories will be analyzed in terms of actions or omissions
by trial counsel. This analysis will attempt to isolate the underlying rea-
soning utilized by the courts in interpreting and applying the Ibarra
standards for determining the effectiveness of counsel in the trial pro-
ceeding. These four general categories involve counsel's (1) faulty ad-
vice on pleas; (2) failure to object to illegal searches and seizures; (3)
failure to raise the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity; and
(4) improper or faulty calling and questioning of witnesses.
Faulty Advise on Pleas
A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a right to assistance
of counsel throughout the preliminary hearings as well as the trial
proceedings.' 8  Thus, effectiveness of counsel may be brought into
question not only during the actual trial, but also during the pleading
stages of the proceedings.' 9 For a convicted defendant to obtain re-
versal on the basis of ineffective assistance during the pleading stage,
he must allege and prove that counsel lacked specific knowledge of the
law and/or facts in the case." This must be proved either by a clear
indication in the trial record or a specific finding of fact by a court-ap-
pointed referee.2' The burden of the defendant in meeting this re-
quirement is well illustrated by a brief comparison of the cases of In re
Hawley22 and In re Williams.23
In Hawley, counsel had extensive evidence of the defendant's in-
sanity but advised the defendant to plead guilty without raising the in-
sanity issue. Although acknowledging the substantial amount of evi-
dence tending to show that defendant was insane, and the high possi-
bility of success counsel might have had in so proving, the appellate
court nevertheless refused to find counsel ineffective. The reason given
by the court was that the defendant had failed to allege and prove that
counsel lacked knowledge of the law regarding the defense of insanity,
and the court thus considered counsel's failure to raise the insanity de-
fense a matter of trial tactics. 24  Generally, in cases where the courts
find that counsel did not lack knowledge either of law or fact, counsel's
18. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19. See In re Hawley, 67 Cal. 2d 824, 433 P.2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1967).
20. See text accompanying notes 26-34 infra.
21. See In re Williams, I Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
22. 67 Cal. 2d 824, 433 P.2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1967).
23. 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
24. See 67 Cal. 2d at 829, 433 P.2d at 922, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 834. Several
decisions with essentially identical factual situations have resulted in similar holdings.
E.g., People v. Massie, 66 Cal. 2d 899, 428 P.2d 869, 59 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1967); People
v. Neder, 16 Cal. App. 3d 846, 94 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1971); In re Scruggs, 15 Cal. App.
3d 290, 93 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1971); People v. Lee, 249 Cal. App. 2d 234, 57 Cal. Rptr.
281 (1967).
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actions, however erroneous, have been attributed to "trial tactics" or
"mistakes of judgment."25
In Williams, on the other hand, the appellate court had appointed
a referee to take evidence and make findings of fact as to trial counsel's
actions. The referee determined as a matter of fact that in a plea bar-
gain in which two other charges were to be dismissed, counsel had
erroneously advised the defendant to plead guilty to a charge of which
he could not otherwise have been convicted in a trial on the merits.
The essential finding by the referee relied upon by the court was
that counsel, without making any investigation of the facts or law of
the case, had advised the defendant to plead guilty. The court con-
cluded, therefore, that counsel lacked knowledge of the law and facts
relevant to the case and was thus ineffective. The significant aspect
of this case is the acceptance by the court of the referee's finding of
fact as conclusive evidence that the defendant had been denied the ef-
fective aid of counsel. However, even though the defendant has proved
counsel's lack of knowledge as to the law and/or facts, he still must
show that counsel's actions were "crucial" in the case. Of course,
since most of the cases which are appealed on the basis of counsel's
advice to plead guilty admittedly involve a "crucial" action, ipso facto,
this additional requirement has been of relatively little significance in
this type of case and the courts only infrequently discuss it. The sole
distinction between Williams and Hawley, therefore, appears to have
been the referee's finding, as a matter of fact, that counsel lacked
knowledge of the law of the case.
Failure to Object to Illegal Search and Seizure
Another category of cases which appear to be treated in a manner
similar to the plea advisement cases by the court are cases involving
search and seizure issues. The defendant attempting to prove ineffec-
tiveness of counsel in cases involving counsel's failure to object to the
introduction of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure
also must allege and prove that counsel lacked knowledge of law or
facts.2 0 So far, this burden has been sustained in search and seizure
25. See text accompanying notes 52-61 infra. Courts have similarly treated
cases involving motions for mistrial and plea advice cases. While there are several
important cases, none have involved express findings of fact by a referee, and none
have involved clearcut statements by counsel indicating failure to investigate relevant
facts or law. None of these cases have, therefore, resulted in a determination that
defendant has been deprived of his right to effective counsel. E.g., People v. Savala,
2 Cal. App. 3d 415, 82 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1969); People v. Scott, 270 Cal. App. 2d 773,
76 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1969); People v. Crowder, 257 Cal. App. 2d 564, 64 Cal. Rptr.
913 (1967).
26. People v. Gallegos, 4 Cal. 3d 242, 481 P.2d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1971);
In re Teran, 65 Cal. 2d 523, 421 P.2d 107, 55 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1966), cert. denied,
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cases only when counsel's statement in the trial record showed con-
clusively that he lacked certain knowledge as, for example, in Ibarra.
As previously noted, in that case counsel's failure to object to the intro-
duction of illegally seized evidence was explained by counsel in a state-
ment for the record to support his action and clearly showed counsel's
erroneous reliance on a case which was not even in point.27
In a similar case, People v. Coffman,25 counsel had failed to
object to evidence obtained in a search conducted by, and on the au-
thority of, a parole agent whose primary function was parole administra-
tion and not law enforcement. Counsel specifically stated to the judge
that he could not object because the search was sanctioned by a prior
California case.29  The appellate court noted that this clearly indicated
counsel had misread the case and concluded on the basis of the trial
record that defendant had not received effective aid of counsel due to
counsel's failure to "investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law"
involved in the case. °
In another case, however, People v. Pineda,31 the court indicated
that a distinction must be drawn between general knowledge of estab-
lished principles and specific knowledge of particular case precedents.
In Pineda counsel filed an affidavit with the court stating that he had
examined the search warrant, and that based on his knowledge of the
law of California at the time, he was of the opinion that the warrant
and affidavit were legally sufficient and that no ground existed on
which to challenge its validity. The warrant, however, was subse-
quently determined to be invalid.12  The appellate court indicated that
the crucial question in the case was whether counsel's affidavit indi-
cated a "lack of preparation and general competence." The court held
that there is a distinction between requiring general knowledge of es-
tablished principles and requiring particular knowledge of each prece-
392 U.S. 941 (1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1963); People v. Lynch, 14 Cal. App. 3d 602, 92 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1971); People
v. Berumen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969); In re Collins, 271 Cal.
App. 2d 195, 76 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969); People v. Thomas, 267 Cal. App. 2d 698, 73
Cal. Rptr. 590 (1968); People v. Pineda, 253 Cal. App. 2d 443, 62 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 984 (1968); People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App. 2d 134,
47 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1965).
27. See note 12 supra.
28. 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
29. People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
30. 2 Cal. App. 3d at 690, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 787, quoting People v. Ibarra, 60
Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386 P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1963).
31. 253 Cal. App. 2d 443, 62 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 984
(1968).
32. It appeared that the search warrant was obtained without any reasonable
cause for its issuance. Entry was subsequently made when the house was deserted.
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dent in which those general principles have been applied to a given
factual situation.3 3 The court further stated that in order for the de-
fendant to prove the incompetency of counsel at trial, the defendant had
to prove that his attorney was unaware of the
constitutional prohibitions on searches and seizures [the court
cited the Fourth Amendment and corresponding sections of the
California Constitution] and the general provisions of laws govern-
ing the issuance of search warrants [the court specifically cited
California Penal Code sections 1523-29].34
Since the defendant was unable to show that counsel was unaware of
these general provisions, the court determined that the defense counsel's
action was merely a "mistake in judgment," and denied relief. The
test formulated by the court in Pineda-proof that the attorney is un-
aware of the applicable provisions of the state and federal constitutions
and a few general statutes-if applied literally, would of course result
in few cases finding "ineffective" counsel. The court in Pineda, how-
ever, had apparently attempted to utilize some type of "reasonable at-
torney" standard in determining lack of knowledge by counsel; this,
in turn, then becomes a question of whether, in the opinion of the
judge, an attorney should have recognized a legal problem in a given
fact situation. Of course, a "reasonable" attorney standard is no more
subject to precise definition than "effective" attorney standards.
As in the plea advisement cases, the defendant must not only
prove lack of knowledge by counsel, he must also show that this re-
sulted in the loss of a "crucial" defense,35 a particularly difficult bur-
den in search and seizure cases. Courts have repeatedly held that if the
evidence would have been admissible on some other basis, failure to
object to its introduction does not indicate that counsel is ineffective.36
Frequently, evidence is obtained under circumstances involving an in-
valid search warrant; however, the admissibility of such evidence is
unaffected because outside factors would have authorized the search
without a warrant.3 7 Beyond a set of circumstances where such outside
33. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 471, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
34. Id. at 469, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
35. See People v. Gallegos, 4 Cal. 3d 242, 481 P.2d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229
(1971); In re Teran, 65 Cal. 2d 523, 421 P.2d 107, 55 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1966), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 941 (1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1963); People v. Lynch, 14 Cal. App. 3d 602, 92 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1971);
In re Collins, 271 Cal. App. 2d 195, 76 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969); People v. Thomas, 267
Cal. App. 2d 698, 73 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1968); People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App. 2d 134,
47 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1965).
36. In re Teran, 65 Cal. 2d 523, 421 P.2d 107, 55 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1966), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 941 (1968); People v. Steams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 178, 92 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1971); People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969); People v.
Berumen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969); In re Collins, 271 Cal. App.
2d 195, 76 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969).
37. See, e.g., People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
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factors are absent, it is difficult to determine what would be deemed to
constitute a "crucial" defense.
In People v. Coffman3" the court attempted to set out a test for
determining "crucialness" in cases admitting illegally obtained evidence.
The court stated that the failure to object to illegally seized evidence
became crucial if, in view of the other evidence in the case, it con-
verted a "reasonable possibility" of receiving a verdict of guilty to a
"virtual certainty." Of course, the criteria utilized by a court to decide
when a "reasonable possibility" is converted into a "virtual certainty"
would appear as difficult and vague as the definition of "crucial" it-
self. The test enunciated in Coffman does, however, follow the under-
lying theme voiced in Ibarra-to be a "crucial defense," the issue need
not be one that will necessarily result in reversal. Probably the only
ascertainable standard to be derived from this test is that harmless
error, as defined by prior decisional law, will not be sufficient to deem
counsel ineffective.
Failure to Raise the Defenses of Insanity
and Diminished Capacity
In the cases involving failure to introduce evidence of insanity or
diminished capacity, the defendant's burden of proof for convincing the
court that counsel was ineffective appears to have been slightly relaxed.
In People v. Welborn,3 9 a prosecution for first degree murder, counsel
argued the issue of insanity at the special sanity hearing but failed to
present extensive evidence' available to him to establish defendant's
diminished capacity at the guilt phase of the trial. While there was no
specific statement in the transcript to indicate counsel's lack of knowl-
edge as to the law regarding diminished capacity, the court found that
the combined effect of counsel's waiver of argument on defendant's
mental state, his stipulation that the case be submitted on the transcript
of the preliminary hearing-which did not contain any information re-
garding several, psychiatric reports-and counsel's failure to object to
denial of the motion for new trial all indicated a basic lack of knowl-
edge on the part of counsel which warranted a determination that coun-
sel was ineffective. 41  The court made its determination of "ineffec-
38. 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
39. 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1967).
40. The available evidence included psychiatric reports of three doctors indicat-
ing conclusively defendant's lack of capacity to understand the nature of his ac-
tions. See id. at 517 n.1, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 11 n.1.
41. "[D]efense counsel's failure to raise the defense of diminished capacity was
the result of ignorance of the law, not trial tactics. Even without defense evidence, the
prosecution's case concerning defendant's mental state at the time of the shooting was
open to argument. Defense counsel waived argument. The psychiatric reports avail-
able to counsel before the trial began pointed to the strong possibility of an abnormal
[Vol. 23
tiveness" in this case without requiring the production of conclusive
proof as to counsel's lack of knowledge required in the other cases dis-
cussed above.42 Also, the court appeared to require less proof on the
issue of crucialness, since the sole basis of the court's determination
that the defense was crucial was that the prosecution's proof of pre-
meditation, deliberateness, and malice aforethought was weak.43
In another case, People v. McDowell,44 which also involved coun-
sel's failure to raise the insanity defense at trial, the lack of knowledge
issue was satisfied by the apparent belief by counsel that since the in-
troduction of evidence regarding the defendant's diminished capacity had
been admitted at the sanity hearing, such evidence could not be intro-
duced at the defendant's subsequent trial. The court apparently
reached its conclusion that the defendant had been denied a crucial de-
fense on the same basis as the court in Welborn-that the prosecu-
tion's proof of the elements of the murder charge was weak.45
Welborn and McDowell appear to be the only two California
cases in which the court determined that counsel had been ineffective
because of his failure to raise issues of insanity.46 Since both cases
involved prosecutions for first degree murder, the underlying reason
for the court's determination regarding crucialness and lack of knowl-
edge may have been the severity of the result to the defendant of any
laxity on the part of counsel and thus the degree of proof required of
the defendant to establish such laxity, both on the issues of knowl-
edge and crucialness, was substantially relaxed. It may be question-
mental condition in this case; yet defense counsel took the initiative in stipulating that
the case be submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing without reference
to the psychiatric reports. The fact that defense counsel again took the initiative in
stipulating that the sanity phase of the trial be submitted on the reports of the psy-
chiatrists indicates that counsel probably thought that the reports were relevant only
to the sanity issue. After the degree of the murder had been fixed as first degree, and
all of the psychiatrists' reports were in evidence, defense counsel submitted the motion
for new trial without argument. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
trial judge considered or was even aware of the possible defense of diminished
capacity." Id. at 522-23, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
42. See text accompanying notes 19-38 supra.
43. "Evidence that defendant suffered from a mental disorder was crucial to his
defense in this case. Since there was no evidence that the homicide was committed in
any of the ways specifically enumerated in Penal Code, section 189, a finding of
first degree murder could only have been predicated on a finding that the killing was
'wilful, deliberate and premeditated.'
"The evidence presented by the prosecution did not provide a strong basis for the
inference that either of the fatal shots was premeditated and deliberate." 257 Cal. App.
2d at 521, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
44. 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
45. See id. at 750-51, 447 P.2d at 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
46. Compare People v. Welborn, 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1967),
with People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 507-08, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (1967).
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able whether the gravity of the penalties involved in particular criminal
cases should affect the degree of proof required to establish ineffective-
ness of counsel; however, at least in these two cases this may have been
an important determinant for the court.
There have been a number of insanity cases in which counsel's
effectiveness was unsuccessfully challenged by defendant. 47  Most of
these decisions rest on the defendant's failure to prove lack of knowledge
on the part of counsel, or the strong possibility that counsel's omission
was simply a matter of trial strategy. For example, in two cases, In re
Hawley4" and People v. Saidi-Tabatabai,9 counsel had advised the de-
fendants to plead guilty in exchange for a recommendation of life im-
prisonment, even though in both cases there was strong evidence of the
defendants' insanity. In both decisions the court held that trial strategy
was involved. In these decisions, the court apparently utilized the same
strict standards as in the plea advice decisions discussed above-
defendant must specifically prove that counsel lacked knowledge of the
law and/or facts.5"
Other sanity cases have involved failure of counsel to introduce
specific evidence on the issue of insanity;5 however, none of these de-
cisions, to date, have held counsel ineffective. The defendants in these
cases were unable to prove counsel's lack of knowledge-clearly a
difficult task in an area so closely interrelated with considerations of
trial strategy. Other cases in which lack of knowledge of counsel has
been shown, usually through specific statements by counsel in the rec-
ord, have been held not to have involved "crucial" defenses. 5l a
Failure to Call and Question Witnesses
Cases involving counsel's effectiveness in eliciting and using testi-
mony of witnesses have arisen quite frequently. This is an area in
which "trial strategy" has traditionally been an almost total bar to a
claim of ineffective aid of counsel. To date, there has been only one
case in which witness evidence has led to a finding of ineffectiveness.
In People v. Wheeler,5 2 which involved a prosecution for assault with a
47. E.g., People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 452 P.2d 637, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1969); People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); People
v. Saidi-Tabatabai, 7 Cal. App. 3d 981, 86 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1970); People v. Glover,
257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967); People v. Birdwell, 253 Cal. App. 2d
621, 61 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1967).
48. 67 Cal. 2d 824, 433 P.2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1967).
49. 7 Cal. App. 3d 981, 86 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1970).
50. See text accompanying notes 19-38 supra.
51. E.g., People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal. 2d 824, 452 P.2d 637, 76 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1969); People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
51a. E.g., People v. Pineda, 253 Cal. App. 2d 443, 62 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 984 (1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
52. 260 Cal. App. 2d 522, 67 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1968).
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deadly weapon, counsel agreed to a stipulation that the case was to be
submitted on the record of the preliminary hearing, subject to the right
to call additional witnesses. At trial, however, counsel called no wit-
nesses, failed to cross examine prosecution witnesses, and, over the
defendant's vigorous protests, failed to allow the defendant to testify.
The appellate court, relying on defendant's statements after pronounce-
ment of the verdict,5 3 determined that there was a complete failure of
communication between the defendant and counsel. The court explained
that counsel's failure to offer any of the several available defenses, and
the failure to call any witnesses at all, indicated counsel's basic lack of
knowledge due to a failure to investigate the facts or the law involved
in the case. The additional issue of whether the defendant had been
denied a crucial defense was not discussed by the court, apparently on
the theory that failure to raise any defense at all, without agreement or
discussion with the client, was itself omission of a "crucial defense."
The very extreme facts in Wheeler indicate the difficulties in proving
counsel's ineffectiveness insofar as the witness' testimony is concerned.
Many cases have arisen due to counsel's failure to call or question wit-
nesses, but no other case has held counsel "ineffective." The failure
to call specific witnesses has been the most frequently litigated issue,"
but in no such case has the defendant been able to overcome the court's
determination that "trial strategy" was involved. Also, the failure to
call subpoenaed witnesses, 55 and to locate possible witnesses56 have
been litigated, but with similar results.
53. The trial court pronounced the verdict, finding defendant guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon. The appellate court included in its opinion a record of the
ensuing interchange: 'THE DEFENDANT: You mean I have been tried? THE
COURT: Certainly. You just got tried and were found guilty. . . . THE DEFEND-
ANT: Wait a minute. I haven't said a word. THE COURT: Take him out of here.
THE DEFENDANT: What is this? THE COURT: Wait a minute. Come here.
This case was submitted on the transcript by your counsel. At the last hearing it was
submitted on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary hearing and I
have read the transcript, and on the basis of the testimony there I found you guilty,
so you have had a trial. What are you complaining about? THE DEFENDANT:
I haven't said a word. THE COURT: You don't have to say a word. Your counsel
didn't put you on. You don't have to say anything. THE DEFENDANT: What did
I pay him for? THE COURT: I don't know. Take him out." Id. at 525-26, 67
Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
54. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608
(1970); People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 455 P.2d 759, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969);
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); People v.
Demerson, 4 Cal. App. 3d 263, 84 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970); People v. Hamilton, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 596, 82 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1969); People v. Fields, 271 Cal. App. 2d 500, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (1969); People v. Ferguson, 255 Cal. App. 2d 493, 63 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1967);
People v. Cuevas, 250 Cal. App. 2d 901, 59 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1051 (1968); People v. Lopez, 249 Cal. App. 2d 93, 57 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1967).
55. People v. Sainz, 253 Cal. App. 2d 496, 61 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1967).
56. People v. Livingston, 4 Cal. App. 3d 251, 84 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1970).
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In the case of People v. Durham,57 counsel's failure to call any
witnesses at the penalty phase of the criminal proceeding was not
deemed "ineffective" without a further showing by the defendant that
specific witnesses would have been "crucial." The same result was
reached in People v. Hill,58 in which the court said that in a criminal
case, to sustain a claim of inadequate representation based on counsel's
failure to call witnesses, there must be a showing that the testimony of
the omitted witness was "material, necessary and admissible.""0  Until
subsequent decisions further explain the determination of a witness's
testimony as "material and necessary," more concrete definitions of
effectiveness of counsel regarding this issue cannot be made.
In the related area of counsel's failure to raise objections to the
testimony of witnesses, similar difficulties exist. A general statement
was made by the court in People v. Davis6" to the effect that counsel's
choice of making objections is inherently a matter of trial tactics, not
ordinarily reviewable on appeal, and a failure to object does not neces-
sarily indicate incompetence of counsel. 6 '
Summary of Trial Standards
The evidence necessary to prove to the court that counsel lacked
knowledge of the law and/or facts, and that such lack of knowledge re-
sulted in the loss of a crucial defense to the defendant at his trial,
clearly varies with the factual situation in each particular case. In
the plea advice cases, proof of counsel's lack of knowledge of the facts
and/or law requires a showing in the record of what amounts to a direct
statement by counsel of his ignorance. Whether such ignorance, if
proven, resulted in the loss of a crucial defense to the defendant is
seldom disputed since the defendant has generally plead guilty in these
cases.
Proof of counsel's lack of knowledge is somewhat more difficult in
the cases dealing with illegal searches and seizures. Not only must an
express statement of counsel be contained in the record, but under the
Pineda rule such statement must conclusively indicate a lack of knowl-
edge by counsel of general constitutional and statutory provisions, and
57. 70 Cal. 2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969).
58. 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
59. Id. at 690, 452 P.2d at 335, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
60. 270 Cal. App. 2d 841, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1969).
61. See, e.g., People v. Mabry, 71 Cal. 2d 430, 455 P.2d 759, 78 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1969); People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 452 P.2d 661, 76 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1969);
People v. Doebke, 1 Cal. App. 3d 931, 81 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969); People v. Davis,
270 Cal. App. 2d 841, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1969); People v. Marsh, 270 Cal. App. 2d
381, 75 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); People v. Fulton,
258 Cal. App. 2d 159, 65 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1968); People v. Wilson, 254 Cal. App. 2d
489, 62 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967).
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ignorance of specific applications of these provisions is not necessarily
enough to deem counsel ineffective. In addition, even if counsel's
lack of knowledge be proven, proof of crucialness is extremely difficult
due to the strong possibility that trial tactics were involved in counsel's
actions.
When the omitted defense is insanity or diminished capacity,
and the case involves a capital offense, the burden to be borne by de-
fendant seems to have been considerably relaxed by the court, appar-
ently due to the severity of the punishment involved. However, in
most cases involving this defense the court appears to find counsel's
omission a matter of trial tactics.
When witness evidence is involved, current decisions indicate an
almost insurmountable burden to be overcome by defendant in proving
ineffectiveness. And while this is the most frequently litigated area,
there was only one case-no witnesses were called and no other de-
fenses were raised-in which the court found counsel ineffective.
Policy Considerations Underlying the Court's Reasoning
The strict requirements of proof which have been imposed by the
court and a pronounced willingness to utilize broad discretion in de-
termining crucialness, both of which have been clearly displayed in de-
cisions thus far, indicate a limited likelihood of success for defend-
ant's contention that his counsel has been ineffective. 62 The underly-
ing reasons for the strict requirements imposed by the courts in
proving ineffective assistance of counsel are basic. It would appear
that the appellate courts fear the familiar "floodgate" problem. Per-
haps less strenuous requirements for proving ineffectiveness would re-
sult in the appellate courts being flooded with unfounded claims of
tactical errors. The convicted defendant would have every reason to
misrepresent his dealings and relations with counsel because he would
have nothing to lose. Ibarra would become a catch-all defense, not
subject to challenge by the prosecution, and difficult to refute if de-
fendant should be willing to misrepresent his dealings with counsel.
This fear by the court may not be completely unfounded. There
is a high incidence of indigency among those accused of crime63 re-
62. It should be noted that in the ninety-seven cases analyzed during prepara-
tion of this article, only eight were successful in their allegation that defendant had been
denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.
63. Professor Kamisar has brought together several sources which indicate that,
depending on the jurisdiction involved, from 30% to 60% of those charged with
crime are financially unable to retain counsel. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and
The Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused, 30 U. CHr. L. RFnv. 1, 5 n.21 (1962), citing E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE
UNrrED STATES 83 (1951); SPECIAL COMM. TO STUry DEFENDER SYSTEMS, BAR ASS'N OF
THE Crry OF NEw YORK, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AccusED 80, 134-35 (1959); Kennedy,
quiring large numbers of court appointed counsel, whose competency
may be more easily challenged by the defendant who "had no choice."
This, combined with the prevalence of jailhouse lawyers, 4 makes the
use of lenient standards impractical. A potential flood of claims is
clearly one to be avoided, and the court appears to work within the
premise that less strict standards would result in larger numbers of con-
viction reversals on appeal on the basis of ineffective counsel. This
could of course result in a serious undermining of the public confi-
dence in attorneys practicing before the bar. On the other hand, the
nebulous quality of the current "standards" may in many ways be the
most practical approach by the courts to an admittedly difficult prob-
lem. The court may apply such standards to the facts of a particular
case when it is readily apparent that there has been a miscarriage of
justice by an important denial of constitutional protections, and at the
same time the court may also dispose of meritless claims without hav-
ing to distinguish among a more detailed set of rules. The fact that the
standards have heretofore become operative only where the inade-
quacy of representation approaches extremes may discourage claims
where representation has been essentially adequate. Conversely, the pres-
ent vague standards may actually spur attorneys representing indigents
to greater efforts, resulting in more effective representation.
Effectiveness of Appointed Appellate Counsel
Once the rights of indigents to counsel was established and general
standards for such counsel at trial set out, it was inevitable that the
California courts would turn to the establishment of practicable stand-
ards for determining the effectiveness of appointive appellate counsel
as well. Three recent California decisions which have attempted to
develop these appellate standards will be discussed below.
In re Smith
In re Smith6" was the first expression of California's nascent stand-
ards for appointive appellate counsel. The defendant was convicted of
the rape of victim A, the attempted kidnapping of victim B, and the kid-
Judicial Administration: Fair and Equal Treatment to All Before the Law, 28 VITAL
SPEECHES 706 (1962). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16-17 (1963).
64. "It is well known that the drafting of petitions of habeas corpus has become
a game in many penal institutions." Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
For the modus operandi of jailhouse lawyers see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel
and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26 (1962); McElwain, Tile Business of the Supreme
Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 21 n.31 (1949).
65. 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
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napping of victim C. The attorney appointed to represent him on
appeal filed an opening brief consisting of a twenty-page recitation of
the facts and a one-page argument. The argument consisted solely of
the claim that the defendant was entitled to reversal of his conviction be-
cause the state had failed to expressly prove that he was not married
to victim A, the young lady he had been convicted of raping. Coun-
sel raised no objections relative to the other two convictions. The
court noted that in view of the fact that the defendant had testified at
trial that he was single, that the victim had testified that she had never
had sexual intercourse prior to the rape, and that both prosecution
and defense counsel repeatedly referred to the victim as "Miss," coun-
sel's argument regarding defendant's possible marriage to the victim
was clearly frivolous.
The court went on to discuss several specific defenses that should
have been raised by counsel at defendant's trial. The court espe-
cially noted that defense counsel had failed to object to the lineup
identification procedure utilized in convicting defendant of kidnap-
ping C. The court recounted that on the night of the alleged inci-
dent C was taken to the police station and the defendant was ex-
hibited to her in a room occupied only by C and a police officer.
C was asked if the defendant was the man who had attacked her,
and she responded affirmatively. Immediately thereafter defendant
was placed in a lineup and C again identified him as the assailant.
The court noted that recent cases involving similar one-man show ups
rendered this procedure an obvious ground of error,66 and concluded
that although factual issues were involved in the determination of
whether the "one-man show up" method was required by exigent cir-
cumstances and whether it affected the subsequent lineup identifica-
tion, objection to this procedure should certainly have been raised by
defendant's counsel. In addition, the court found that the evidence at
trial was conflicting since C had told the police prior to the lineup that
her assailant was a Negro approximately twenty or twenty-two years old,
about five feet six inches tall, and weighing 150 pounds. In fact, the de-
fendant was six feet tall and weighed 180 pounds, and the court con-
cluded that counsel's failure to raise this conflict in C's identification
was highly prejudicial to the defendant.
The court also found that the defendant's conviction for the at-
tempted kidnapping of victim B was subject to plausible arguments
of error. Defendant's alleged encounter with B took place after she
had parked and locked her automobile. A man stopped B to ask
directions, and then grabbed her arm, brandished a screwdriver and
ordered her to unlock the door on the driver's side of her car. B in-
66. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.
2d 183, 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
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dicated that since she was too frightened to unlock the door, she
had given her purse to the assailant. While the man searched for
the keys another car pulled alongside and in the confusion B was
able to escape. The court noted that it was at least arguable that de-
fendant's alleged conduct in regard to B exhibited neither the intent
nor the action (preparation v. perpetration) requisite to a conviction
of attempted kidnapping. The only direct evidence of the assailant's
intent was his statement, paraphrased by B as follows: [after ordering
her to unlock the door on the driver's side] "that we were going in my
car."367  The court reasoned that such a statement standing alone was
not an unequivocal expression of an intent to abduct B, and that even
though the victim had been forced to enter the car another explana-
tion, as plausible as kidnapping, was the inference that defendant in-
tended to rape his victim inside her car without driving it away, or
that he intended to rob her or steal her car. Furthermore, defendant's
actions to accomplish his criminal purpose arguably did not reach a stage
of development beyond mere preparation. Counsel had raised none of
these contentions at trial or on appeal.
Another possible ground of error noted by the court was the victim's
in-court identification of the defendant, since B was unable or unwilling
to positively identify the defendant in the lineup, but later did identify
him at trial. B explained this by saying that she had been given a "re-
fresher" prior to trial, and since the defendant was in court, he must have
been the assailant. The explanations given by the victim for the positive
in-court identification of defendant-a "refresher" and the fact that he
was "here" on trial-were found very questionable by the court, and ap-
pellate counsel was found remiss in failing to discuss the credibility of
the victim's identification of the defendant and the sufficiency of the
evidence in general.
The court then reviewed the only aspect of the case to which
appellate counsel gave any attention in his brief-the conviction of
defendant for the kidnapping and rape of A. Unfortunately, the lone
issue counsel chose to raise on appeal-the possibility that the de-
fendant and victim were married-was so perceptibly weak that it
probably would have been better overlooked according to the court.
The court noted several other assignments of error that argu-
ably might have justified a reversal of the rape conviction. The rape
victim had identified defendant at a lineup and again at the trial. The
court cited two aspects of the lineup procedure which should have
been discussed on appeal: first A had testified that immediately be-
fore the lineup she was shown a small number of photographs, one
of which resembled defendant. She had not been able to identify
67. 3 Cal. 3d at 196, 474 P.2d at 970, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
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any of the suspects pictured; however, she did state that none of
the pictures resembled any of the other men in the lineup. The
court concluded that counsel could have argued that the photographs
were used to "prime" the victim to pick out the defendant in the
subsequent lineup; a display of photographs to a witness immediately
before a lineup was clearly improper because of the attendant danger
of undue suggestion to the witness. The court also noted a second
possible deficiency in the lineup procedure in that A testified on cross-
examination that only the defendant, among the four persons in the
police lineup, approximated her description of the assailant. The
court cited the case of People v. Douglas,68 decided a few months
prior to the trial, which had held that this type of lineup procedure
was a violation of due process requirements under the Constitution.
On the basis of its review of the record of the case, the California
Supreme Court found assignments of error that might arguably have
justified a reversal, and with the defendant's allegations set forth in
the writ of habeas corpus, counsel had failed to render the thoughtful
assistance to which the defendant was entitled. 9 Of significance was
the fact that the defendant was not required to show that he was en-
titled to reversal on the merits in order to show the prejudicial effect
of ineffective counsel. The court briefly reviewed Anders v. Califor-
nia ° and People v. Feggans l and then proceeded to apply the stand-
ards enunciated in People v. Ibarra,'72 explaining that:
[In Ibarra] we did not indicate that the "crucial defense" withdrawn
by defendant's incompetent trial counsel would have resulted in
a verdict for defendant or even in suppression of the evidence seized
by the police. Rather, we held that "[c]ounsel's failure to object
precluded resolution of the crucial factual issues supporting de-
fendant's primary defense." [Citation omitted.] The defense
was crucial because it arguably might have produced a verdict for
defendant, not because it would have inevitably achieved a favor-
able result.73
The court specifically limited its decision in Smith to the inexcusable
failure of defendant's appellate counsel to raise crucial assignments of
error that arguably might have resulted in a reversal, and stated:
We do not suggest that failure of appellate counsel in a future
case to raise . . . specific potential assignments of error . . . will
establish that the appellant was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel. Future cases must be decided on their own facts, and the
determination of each will depend on whether the appellant's
68. 259 Cal. App. 2d 694, 66 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1968).
69. 3 Cal. 3d at 202, 474 P.2d at 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
70. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
71. 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432 P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
72. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
73. 3 Cal. 3d at 202, 474 P.2d at 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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counsel failed to raise assignments of error which were crucial in
the context of the particular circumstances at hand. Nor do we
decide in the instant case whether failure to raise any one of the
several assignments of error overlooked by appellate counsel would
have indicated ineffective assistance; we hold only that failure to
raise all of them constituted such indicium. 74
Of primary significance is the court's adoption of the Ibarra trial stand-
ards75 for determining competency of counsel on appeal.
In re Greenfield
Following the Smith ruling by the California Supreme Court, the
court of appeal decided In re Greenfield,76 which again raised the ques-
tion of competence of appellate counsel. The facts of this case are
briefly set out below.
In December 1966 defendant was convicted of second degree
burglary7 7 and receiving stolen goods.7 8 The conviction was affirmed
by the court of appeal; 9 a rehearing was denied, and the supreme
court denied a petition for hearing. In September 1970, while de-
fendant was an inmate at Folsom State Prison, the court of appeal held
a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus filed by the defendant in
which were alleged certain constitutional infirmities in the defend-
ant's conviction attributed to ineffective representation of counsel.
In the trial proceedings, defendant's trial counsel, a deputy public
defender, moved that the superior court set aside the third count, a
credit card violation, on the ground that defendant had not actually
succeeded in obtaining the merchandise, and "that there was no corpus
[delicti] established." The deputy district attorney conceded the mer-
its of the motion. Asked by the trial court whether an order setting
aside the third count would be proper, the district attorney responded
in the affirmative, and the order was then made.
At the hearing on defendant's writ of habeas corpus, the court of
appeal noted that both attorneys, as well as the superior court, were
apparently unaware that Penal Code section 484a(b) (6) proscribed
attempts to secure merchandise as well as completed acts, and that the
third count should have been amended, not set aside. By setting
aside the third count, the trial court had inadvertently removed from
the case the only charge whose validity was beyond question. The
court of appeal noted that petitioner's trial counsel thus had an excel-
lent chance of establishing invalidity of the charge of receiving stolen
74. Id. at 203, 474 P.2d at 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
75. See text accompanying notes 11-61 supra.
76. 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
77. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 459-61 (West 1970).
78. Id. § 496.
79. 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
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credit cards and at least an arguable case for nullifying the burglary
count as well. Yet, at no time during the trial court proceedings
had defendant's counsel attacked the validity of those charges, and the
defendant had been found guilty on both counts. The court of appeals
further noted that in the initial appeal of the case, another attorney had
been appointed to represent the defendant, and even though two su-
preme court cases had arisen between trial and the initial appeal which
lent support to the invalidity of defendant's conviction on the remain-
ing charges, the appellate counsel had failed to raise this ground of error.
The court of appeals thus concluded that defendant had been de-
nied the effective assistance of counsel-both at trial and on appeal.
The reversal of the conviction on the basis of performance of trial
counsel is so nearly identical to the case of In re Williams, ° dis-
cussed above,8 that further analysis would not be worthwhile. The
court's comments regarding appellate counsel do, however, warrant
some consideration.
The basic thrust of Greenfield was that counsel must serve as an
advocate and raise all issues before the court that are "crucial" under
the circumstances. The court noted that in criminal cases the Cali-
fornia courts have long recognized that when, through ignorance or
omission, defense counsel causes the loss of a crucial defense in the
trial court, there has been a denial of the constitutional right to counsel
which infects the conviction with fundamental unfairness and requires
its reversal. 82 Therefore, the court reasoned, when incompetent or in-
adequate representation by appointed counsel causes the loss of a cru-
cial defense on appeal, a similar result must follow since the state is
constitutionally obliged to furnish counsel whose advocacy will permit
full consideration and resolution of the crucial issues.83
In re Banks
A third case involving competency of appellate counsel was re-
cently decided by the California Supreme Court, In re Banks.84 In
that case defendant was convicted on two counts of robbery and one
count of attempted robbery. The defendant conducted his own de-
fense at trial but after he was convicted requested that counsel be ap-
80. 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969).
81. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
82. In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969);
People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); People v.
Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
83. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743-44 (1967); People v. Feggans,
67 Cal. 2d 444, 447-48, 432 P.2d 21, 24-25, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421-22 (1967).
84. 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1971). The defendant
had a long history of appeals to the United States Supreme Court, but as the prior
appearances are only of marginal interest they are omitted from this discussion.
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pointed to represent him on appeal. Counsel was appointed but
through numerous extensions delayed filing a brief for fifteen months.
Even then counsel filed a short (twenty-one page) brief with only one
page devoted to argument. The conviction was affirmed by the court
of appeals. The defendant, through his own efforts, brought the case
before the California Supreme Court and obtained a reversal of the de-
cision against him; the case was remanded for retrial and the same
counsel was appointed by the court to represent the defendant at his
second trial. The defendant requested that the court appoint different
counsel, and the court refused. The defendant's counsel failed to
submit any brief, make any motion, or appear to argue the case, nor
did he make any explanation for these omissions. On retrial, the
defendant was again convicted. Through his own efforts, the defendant
sought further relief and again the case was remanded for retrial.
The defendant again requested appointment of other counsel for the
retrial, and was again refused. Defendant's appointed counsel again
failed to aid defendant in his case in any way, and the conviction was
affirmed a second time. The defendant then filed a writ of habeas
corpus with the California Supreme Court and alleged, among other er-
rors, 5 that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
This writ was granted, the conviction reversed, and the case remanded
to the superior court for trial.
The supreme court's opinion of the brief filed on the first appeal
is made clear by the following comments:
The brief mentions only two cases. One point raised demonstrated
complete ignorance of when the information was filed and when
the trial commenced. The strongest ground for claiming error in
the trial record, given the state of the law in early 1964, related to
denial of counsel at trial. Yet Gideon v. Wainwright . . . is no-
where mentioned in counsel's brief. Although making a number
of additional claims of error, counsel nowhere marshalled the evi-
dence to show that such claimed errors would be prejudicial in
view of the record as a whole. The most obvious conclusion to
be drawn from reading the brief is that counsel gave it no thought
whatsoever, but instead retyped suggestions submitted to him by
petitioner, a layman.8 6
The court, in addition, noted counsel's total inaction in the two en-
suing appeals.
In granting the writ, the court acknowledged that although a de-
fendant's right to appointed counsel does not include the right to require
the court to appoint any specific counsel; a defendant is entitled to
relief where the record clearly shows that the first counsel appointed
85. The other alleged errors were denial of counsel at trial, improper lineup
procedure, and use of defendant's silence as an adoptive admission.
86. 4 Cal. 3d at 340-41, 482 P.2d at 217, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
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to him is not adequately representing him.8 7  The court felt that the
failure of defendant's attorney to argue at any time any of the specific
issues on the two remands made it clear that the defendant lacked ef-
fective assistance of counsel. The court explained:
Here, as in In re Smith . . ."petitioner would have fared better
had his attorney withdrawn in favor of a pro se brief from peti-
tioner, . . ." In effect, petitioner was not represented by counsel
and was thus clearly denied his right to assistance of counsel.88
Conclusion
The three recent cases involving appointive appellate counsel
were clearly extreme situations. The court in each case purported to
adopt the Ibarra trial standards for determining whether the defendant
had been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. The only
apparent modification of the trial standards indicated by the court were
those due to the nature of appellate review, such as the change in term-
inology from "crucial defense" to "crucial assignments of error, which
arguably might have resulted in a reversal."8 9  In Smith and Banks
the court emphasized that for there to be an arguable ground of error,
it was not essential that the issue result in reversals; this, of course, is
the same standard utilized in determining the effect of the omission of
a "crucial" defense at trial.
90
The unanswered question is whether the courts will continue to
apply standards similar to those used at trial to determine effective-
ness of counsel on appeal. The three decisions on effectiveness of ap-
pellate counsel discussed above-the only three cases thus far which
have attempted to deal with the issue-have involved such extreme
circumstances as to represent almost a complete denial of counsel and
can really not be said to have established any standard.9 1 The court in
each of the cases alluded to the extreme factual situation presented and
noted that the defendant was, in effect, not represented by counsel at
all.
87. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 123, 465 P.2d 44, 47, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156,
159 (1970), quoting People v. Mitchell, 185 Cal. App. 2d 507, 512, 8 Cal. Rptr.
319, 323 (1960).
88. 4 Cal. 3d at 343, 482 P.2d at 219, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
89. See In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 202-03, 474 P.2d 969, 975, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1,
7 (1970).
90. See the discussion on trial standards in text accompanying notes 11-61 supra.
91. In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d 337, 340, 282 P.2d 215, 217, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591, 593
(1971) (". .. point raised demonstrated complete ignorance . . "); In re Smith.
3 Cal. 3d 192, 198, 474 P.2d 969, 972, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1970) ("The purported ar-
gument consisted of the ludicrous proposition . .. "); In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App. 3d
536, 541, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847, 849 (1970) ("... two flimsy issues raised by the attor-
ney . .").
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The extreme factual situations in the three cases precludes any
accurate formulation of standards for effectiveness of counsel on appeal,
and also limits any analogy with trial situations to determine whether the
California courts are attempting to apply trial standards to the appel-
late area. If the extreme factual situations in Banks, Greenfield,
and Smith truly represent what will be deemed necessary to prove in-
effectiveness of appointive appellate counsel, it is doubtful that very
much incompetency of counsel will be established with any frequency
in the immediate future.
It is more likely, however, that future litigation in the area will
allow formulation of more definitive standards similar to those in the
trial area discussed above. Quite possibly appellate standards will be
made more rigorous by the court for the same reasons that trial stand-
ards, as noted above, are strictly applied-a balancing of the rights of
indigents to effective representation, with the fear of a flood of litiga-
tion and the undermining of confidence in the California judicial sys-
tem. At present, however, any formulation of standards for appointive
appellate counsel, or conclusions as to whether trial standards have, in
fact, been applied to the appellate level is not warranted. The severity
of the facts in the three cases decided to date, combined with the less
strict standards indicated by the purported adoption of trial standards,
indicates that further litigation will be necessary to clarify any court
imposed standards for appellate counsel. Clearly this will occur, for
the very nature of the judicial system is to weigh and balance prob-
lems of the present so that the law may be changed, expanded, and,
hopefully, improved as warranted.
William R. Christian*
* Member, Second Year Class
THtE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 23
